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  • apparent target for an attack was Syria. If Israel attacked Syria , Hussein continued, Jordan would not take action unless the U.A.R. intervened, 1 From Tel Aviv , tel. 3648, May 18, 1967, secret/nodis . 2 Memor~ndum of telephone conversation between
  • -------- ---------------------------- , .. . '. =10PSECRfTTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20301 CM-2944-68 3 Feb 1968 ...__ MEMORANDUMFOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: KHE SANH DECLASSIFIED Authority Jc S II)- 3 - 7i' ~ '{P , NARS, Date By ::::s 3- /' - 77 In response to your telephone call
  • ~O 1 ~\.-, roeSECR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DECLASS WASHINGTON, IFIED 11', .'~-~~;;_JJ. ~ 0 D. C. 203 1 ~~~ ✓0-3 7?~ ~ , 'AR , Date -3-/6--7'J.. ~~-~~~li~~S :utho~ty Y MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Telephone Conversation
  • in the northern period two areas." At this concern point, about the President again expressed Khe Sanh. - In a telephone Westmoreland reaffirmed When General Wheeler and Wheeler's agreement the President be informed call to General
  • -------------------­ believed pp position-----­ qq man in Hanoi----------------------------­ rr of U Thant's ss account msg, away from Fanfani memo, memo, talks conversation with Mai Van Bo - - with NVN regarding Khe Sanh battle questions may be over related 5
  • Rusk's le~ter of last now, saying simply that "I have read December, and agree with it. 11 3. Telephone Fulbright and tell him "I am not going to order Secretary Rusk to go before the Committee in an open hearing. 4. Telephone Fulbright and invite him
  • in a telephone conversation with General Westmoreland that "gravel has been laid north of Khe Sanh. " at the present afternoon. Bob said we h~ no other information available time, but would probably find out more this Art Mc Cafferty f' . ! INFORMATION
  • MEMOS January: 30 - - Situation A in SVN #3 31 -- Telephone Conversation 31 -- Spot Report on Situation with Saigon Station------------------ in Hue ----------------------------- B C 31 -- Situation in SVN #4
  • of conversation: 21 -- CIA memo, 22 -- SitRoom U Thant/Bunche communist report, forces in TET -- - -- -- --- ------------------- Memo to McNamara 23 Ginsburgh memo, status 23 Ginsburgh memo, reserve 23 -- Rostow summary 23 -- Rostow msg
  • with other enemy facilities in northern South Vietnam involves the construction of landline telephone circuits along the Laos-GVN border from the m.1zto the A Shau area. Completion of the links will provide an additional element of security, as well
  • 203 236 1, 678 688 1 s transcript I am attaching a copy of Gen. Westmoreland of his of the conversation with you last evening and his latest assessment situation around Kh Sanh. White House Briefing Si".:1.1ation Room Officer
  • , 7:45 p.m. 8, 1968 ~ Feb. ,_~,.,v~ ,cJJ_, o---D ,c,,,q > Herewith General Walt's evaluation of the Khe Sanh position. As you see, it arose from a cocktail party conversation - - but outside of Georgetown. ,..: SECRE'f attachment ,, I 1
  • bill. I hope this will be the first of many measures that will mark this Congress as the Consumers' Congress. NOTE: The President spoke at 12:45 p.m. in the East Room at the White House. . . A Conversation of the President and George Meany Advisory
  • talents and energy far beyond the call of duty. You appear to have survived remarkably well, I may say. I recall with satisfaction the several meetings and conversations I have had with you during these 7 years. You have always been respon­ sive
  • IN THE CONVERSATION. TH E IM PLIC A TIO N WAS THAT TH ERE WAS A P O S S IB IL IT Y THAT TH E A USTRALIA N S WOULD RESPOND TO A REQ UEST FOR MORE TROOPS BUT THAT THE INCREASE IN STRENGTH WOULD TAKE SOME TIM E AND WOULD BE A D IF F IC U L T DECISIONo 3* I TOLD HIM THA T
  • • • ._ • OU present • . Meeting had ~en arranged because November 25 he had very importan.t . ·­ !KSZk ., ro , message from President Ayub and that he would stay as long as necessary to meet tl1e President and deliver it. At beginning of conversation
  • be done. \ i | 1 2. Moro of Itoly in conversation with Harilman expressed support of the principles of the United States* position but did not state v/hetiier tliere was any hope for increased aid. Later Nenni authorised Harriman to quote Mm to Tito
  • ..::..::..;_;...:.:.__ _---:-.-uo:=-=i Offiur) 7/20/64 OJ. - J- .. .C.~ .: - :: .. , ~ ;_ ~- ; _; _fi__ lUl.)7!.J D EPARTMENT OF' STATE h M emorandum ol Conversation DATE: SUOJECT: -•J J uly is. ~ 1964 President ' s Conversation with Ambas'lador UcConaughy
  • ~ MY V I S I T IN DANANG-HUE AREA INCLUDED EXTENDED V IS IT S AND INFORiiAL ■ CONVERSATIONS U IT H ALL OF SENIOR MARINE OFFICERS ASHORE, V IS IT IN G ALL FOUR BATTALIONS IN T H E IR F IE L D PO SITIO NS AND TA LKS U IT H OFFICERS DOyN TO COMPANY LE V E
  • conversation., I believe we face a bat·l·age o! cl.'iticism ili the pi·ess· ar1d 01, the Hill i£ we do not answer a n.u,·t1ber of queries we 11.owha.ve fro:rn both sources concerning deploymen.t rnodificat:ior,.s in ou·r Vietnam assigrnnent policies related
  • !nent.!_ ; Increased tempo of operations 92 35 .. 156 286 22 50 • 555 0 23 52 270 in Southeast Asia l"equil'es conversion or add.5.ttonal BVJlShips, installa.tion of a.ddJtional electronics counter­ measures, 1ncraased overhauls, rno1'e
  • on Monday, 2. Congressional A ctions. a; Consuitation w ith Leadership. Apart fro m the P re sid e n t's personal conversations
  • of support of tho DRV from the USSR, Conversely, US a ir eitackcj to cllmiixato MIG/IL-28 a irc raft and SA-2 capabilitiao could causa Intensification of domestic and foreign political coutroverey on US policy vvlth reopsct to Southeant Acia, might tend
  • OF STRIKING and CLEARING IT OF THE .MIG THREAT? ALSO, THE OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE I L - 2 S BECOI'iES GREATER, CONVERSELY, WITH SAM’ S VKNON-OPERATIONAL THE MIG’ S AT PHUC YEN POSE,LESS OF A THREAT AND THE I L - 2 S ’ S CNNOT BE CONSIDERED AS TOO ,,SERIOUS
  • be p rim a ry or' secondary m issio n s. Renouf said th is would seem to square w ith h is record of the Bundy* W a lle r conversation where Bundy said that the force's m issio n would be Q U O TE se c u rity p lus UN Q UO TE. GP-1. EN D